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Abstract 
We compute average mark-ups as a measure of market power throughout time and 
study their interaction with fiscal policy and macroeconomic variables in a VAR 
framework. From impulse-response functions the results, with annual data for a set of 
14 OECD countries covering the period 1970-2007, show that the mark-up (i) depicts a 
pro-cyclical behaviour with productivity shocks and (ii) a mildly counter-cyclical 
behaviour with fiscal spending shocks. We also use a Panel Vector Auto-Regression 
analysis, increasing the efficiency in the estimations, which confirms the country-
specific results. 
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Mark-up, VAR, Panel VAR. 
JEL Classification: D4, E0, E3, H6. 5
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Non-technical summary 
The interaction between imperfect competition and fiscal-policy effectiveness has 
deserved a fair share of attention in economic theory. Most theoretical models tend to 
associate larger mark-ups with higher fiscal policy effectiveness due to either a (short-run) 
pure profits multiplier mechanism or to a (long-run) entry effect that increases factor 
efficiency – increasing returns to entry or endogenous mark-ups. Nonetheless, there is no 
consensus on the topic, as preferences, technologies, heterogeneity of firms, and types of 
taxation are crucial for the theoretical outcomes obtained. Thus, taking the theory to the test 
of data is an important step in order to derive some useful policy implications, both in 
qualitative and quantitative terms. However, the empirical analysis of the connection between 
market power and the effects of fiscal shocks is scant. 
In this paper we generate annual mark-up time series for a group of OECD countries for 
the 1970-2007 period, following the Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) approach. However, 
we introduce a methodological innovation since we allow for smooth changes in the 
technological parameters. Furthermore, we also generate a total-factor-productivity measure 
compatible with the above-mentioned mark-up series. Moreover, we also study the interaction 
between fiscal policy, macroeconomic variables, and market-power measures using a VAR 
specification.
We produce illustrative results with annual data for a group of 14 OECD countries, in the 
period 1970-2007: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the US. The VAR impulse response functions 
show that, in general the mark-up (i) depicts a pro-cyclical behaviour with productivity 
shocks and (ii) a mildly counter-cyclical behaviour with fiscal spending shocks. 
Finally, using also a Panel Vector Auto-Regression analysis, which allows increasing the 
efficiency of the estimations, we are able to essentially confirm the country-specific results 
regarding the mark-up pro (counter)-cyclicality with productivity (fiscal spending) shocks. 
From a policy point of view, positive productivity shocks imply, by its nature, a rightward 
shift in labour demand, but an increased mark-up weakens the initial expansive effect on both 
employment (and output) and real wages. On the other hand, positive fiscal shocks show, 
besides their usual wealth effect via future taxes expanding the labour supply, an additional 
effect due to a decrease in the mark-up that shifts the labour demand rightwards, stimulating 
further employment (and output) and also real wages. Our results, illustrating the counter-6
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cyclical behaviour of the mark-up with fiscal spending shocks, imply a stronger effectiveness 
of fiscal policy on output and this is especially relevant when the fiscal multiplier is positive. 7
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1. Introduction 
The interaction between imperfect competition and fiscal-policy effectiveness has 
deserved a fair share of attention in economic theory – see Costa and Dixon (2009) for a 
survey. Most theoretical models tend to associate larger mark-ups with higher fiscal policy 
effectiveness due to either a (short-run) pure profits multiplier mechanism or to a (long-run) 
entry effect that increases factor efficiency – increasing returns to entry or endogenous mark-
ups. Nonetheless, there is no consensus on the topic, as preferences, technologies, 
heterogeneity of firms, and types of taxation are crucial for the theoretical outcomes obtained. 
Thus, taking the theory to the test of data is an important step in order to derive some useful 
policy implications, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. However, the empirical 
analysis of the connection between market power and the effects of fiscal shocks is scant. 
Imperfect competition has a special role in the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy 
when mark-ups vary endogenously along the business cycle. New Keynesian synthesis 
models produce undesired endogenous mark-ups due to nominal rigidity, enhancing the 
effectiveness of demand-side policy, including fiscal policy – see Linnemann and Schabert 
(2003) for an example with productive public expenditure. Additionally, recent interest in 
macroeconomic models where desired mark-ups vary over time make the research topic even 
more attractive, as they work similarly to productivity shocks in the presence of active fiscal 
policy – see Barro and Tenreyro (2006), Bilbiie et al. (2007), dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt 
(2006), dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2005), Jaimovich (2007), Jaimovich and 
Floetotto (2008), amongst others. 
One of the reasons why empirical research in this area is not abundant is related to the 
limited availability of time series for mark-ups as a measure of market power. There are 
several papers that try to measure mark-ups for different industries and sectors over a period, 
following the seminal paper of Hall (1988), e.g. Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008), 
Martins et al. (1996), and Roeger (1995). Despite the fact these studies do not provide time 
series for mark-ups, there is some evidence on its mildly counter-cyclical behaviour provided 
in Martins and Scarpetta (2002). However, the production of time series for mark-ups for the 
US economy has been done by Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1999) (henceforth RW) 
using macroeconomic data and simple assumptions on both the technology used and the long-
run features exhibited by the variables. 
We follow the RW approach to generate mark-up time series for OECD countries. We 
introduce a methodological innovation since we allow for smooth changes in the 8
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technological parameters. Furthermore, we also generate a total-factor-productivity measure 
compatible with the above-mentioned mark-up series.  
We produced illustrative results with annual data for a group of 14 OECD countries in the 
period 1970-2007: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the US. The VAR impulse-response functions 
show that, in general the mark-up (i) depicts a pro-cyclical behaviour with productivity 
shocks and (ii) a mildly counter-cyclical behaviour with fiscal spending shocks  
Finally, using also a Panel Vector Auto-Regression analysis, which allows increasing the 
efficiency of the estimations, we are able to essentially confirm the country-specific results 
regarding the mark-up pro (counter)-cyclicality with productivity (fiscal spending) shocks. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section two describes the theoretical 
underpinnings of our mark-up measures. Section three jointly computes the average mark-up 
and total factor productivity (TFP) throughout time. Section four conducts the VAR analysis 
and section five estimates a panel VAR. Section six concludes. 
2. The mark-up: theoretical framework 
In this section we use economic theory to produce time series for average mark-ups, a 
variable that cannot be directly observed. The “mark-up” is usually defined as a measure of 
the distance between prices and marginal costs. It expresses the power firms have to set a 
price above its cost of producing an additional unit of output, i.e. the market power. 
In the presence of a positive supply shock, we expect the marginal cost function to shift 
downwards, i.e. the marginal cost tends to decrease for a given output. Therefore, assuming 
that the indirect effect on prices via demand is small, mark-ups tend to increase implying a 
pro-cyclical average mark-up. 
When a positive shock originates in the demand side (e.g. a fiscal policy shock), the 
marginal cost function is only indirectly affected and the main effect depends on how the 
demand function faced by individual producers responds to the shock. Nominal rigidity 
(Clarida et al. (1999), Goodfriend and King (1997), Hairault and Portier (1993)), varying 
composition of aggregate demand (Galí (1994a, 1994b)), deep habits in consumption (Ravn et 
al. (2006)), variety-specific subsistence levels (Ravn et al. (2008)), non-CES utility functions 
(Feenstra (2003)), implicit collusion in the supply side (Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 
1992)), Cournot competition (Costa (2004), Portier (1995)), or feedback effects of entry 9
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(Linnemann (2001), Jaimovich (2007)) are just examples of models that produce counter-
cyclical mark-ups in the presence of demand shocks. 
The combination of both types of shocks with the above-described features is a possible 
explanation for the existing evidence on mildly counter-cyclical mark-ups that can be found 
in Martins and Scarpetta (2002) or Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), inter alia. 
2.1. Definitions 
There are two widely-used measures of market power: 








   ,  (1) 
where Pit represents the price of the good produced by firm i and MCit stands for its marginal 
cost, both measured for period t. This measure is increasing with market power and ranges 
between 0, the perfectly competitive case where Pit = MCit, and 1, the degenerate-monopoly 
case where the firm can set an infinite price when compared to its marginal cost. 
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which is also an increasing function of the market power and it ranges between 1 and +f.










In this paper we will use (2) when referring to the “mark-up” as a measure of market power.
The basic problem in determining mark-up measures lies in the fact that marginal costs are 
not directly observable. Thus, the usual approach consists of using economic relationships to 
estimate marginal costs. For a cost-minimising and profit-maximising firm, we know that its 
marginal cost is equal to the ratio between the price of an input and its marginal productivity. 
Thus, considering that labour is more easily measured than other inputs, we can estimate the 
marginal cost using the following relationship: 10
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   ,  (3) 
where Wt represents the nominal wage per unit of labour
1 and MPLit stands for the marginal 
product of labour. However, once again, the latter is not directly observable and we have to 










 ,  (4) 
where Lit is the labour input used in the production of firm i, here represented by Yit. A 
general production function can be represented by 
 , . it it YF L    ,  (5) 
and we can assume it has the usual properties, namely a positive but decreasing MPLit.
2.2. Average mark-ups 
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) let us assume the representative firm in the 
economy uses a technology that can be represented by the following production function: 

1 .. tt
tt t t t YA KL
DD    )  ,  (6) 
where Yt stands for the output, Kt is the capital stock used, and Lt represents the labour input 
used by the representative firm. At is a (non-observable) measure of TFP, 0 < Dt < 1, and )t > 
0. Notice that if we had )t = 0, we would obtain a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas 
production function. However, without a fixed cost it would be impossible to sustain 
imperfect competition in the long run for this economy. 
Real pure profits of this representative firm are given by 
1 Here, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that all firms use a homogeneous labour input. 11
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tt t YT C S    ,  (7) 
where TCt represents total costs of producing goods for the representative firm in the 
economy. Since we only consider costs of hiring labour and capital services, total costs are 
given by 







   ,  (8) 
where Rt is the nominal rental price of capital and Pt is the aggregate price index relevant for 
producers.
Given the existence of imperfect competition in product markets, real factor prices are not 
equal to their marginal products: 
, tt t t
tt tt
W MPL R MPK
PP P P
    ,  (9) 
where MPK stands for the marginal product of capital. 
Thus, if we substitute (6), (8), and (9) in (7) we obtain the following expression for profits: 
1 1
.. . tt t







  ) ¨¸
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 .  (10) 
2.3. Aggregate variables’ long-run constraints 









   .  (11) 
Now, using both (6) and (9) in (11), we obtain the following short-run expression for the 
mark-up as a function of the labour share: 12
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In the long run entry and exit eliminate pure profits. Thus, the following equalities must 
hold in order to obtain 
*
t S = 0 from (10) and where asterisks identify the balanced-growth-












)  . (13) 
Therefore, using (13) in (12), we can obtain the long-run share of wages in aggregate 
income that is given by 
* 1 tt s D    .  (14) 
In a previous version we analysed the effect of considering the representative firm as the 
average firm in the economy. However, to do this we need a long time series for the total 
number of firms or establishments in the economy. We succeeded to obtain data for the 
Netherlands (1983-2007), Sweden (1971-2007), and the US (1964-2007). However, we 
concluded that the results were virtually identical, as our benchmark mark-up measure was 
very similar considering or not the effect of changes in the number of firms.
2 Therefore, we 
considered that the benefit of enlarging the country sample was greater than the cost of 
ignoring the effects of entry and exit on the benchmark mark-up measures. 
                                                
2 The correlations of the cyclical components of the benchmark mark-up measures for the common periods are 
respectively 0.954, 0.813, and 0.915. 13
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3. Computing the average mark-up throughout time 
3.1. The data 
We consider the following OECD countries for which there was data on average mark-ups 
for a long recent period (broadly for the period 1970-2007): Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the 
US.
The macroeconomic variables were taken from the European Commission AMECO 
database (codes in brackets) and correspond to: 
- Yt represents real GDP (1.1.0.0.OVGD) per capita, i.e. per head between 15 and 64 years 
old (1.0.0.0.NPAN), measured in 2000 Purchasing Power Standards (PPS). 
- Kt stands for real capital stock (1.0.0.0.OKND) per capita, measured in 2000 PPS. 
- Lt is total hours worked, i.e. the product of average hours per employee (1.0.0.0.NLHA) 
and total employment (1.0.0.0.NETN). 
- st represents the adjusted wage share in total income (1.0.0.0.ALCD0).
3
- Pt stands for the GDP deflator calculated as the ratio between nominal GDP 
(1.0.0.0.UVGD) and real GDP. Considering that we want a proxy for the relevant prices for 
producers, the price deflator is divided by 1 + Wt, where Wt represents the ratio between indirect 
taxes (1.0.0.0.UTVG) minus subsidies (1.0.0.0.UYVG) and nominal GDP.
4
- Wt is the adjusted hourly nominal wage rate obtained as st.Pt.Yt/Lt.
For the data on P
*
t
 average mark-ups for the period 1980-92 for 14 OECD countries.
                                                
3 This share is adjusted using the ratio between the concepts of employment and number of employees (in full-
time equivalents when available) that exist in the national accounts for domestic industries. 
4 Fluctuations in the prices of intermediate goods affect both prices and marginal costs. However, considering 
that annual information on input-output tables is not available and also that we use a value-added measure for 
mark-ups, we assume that the effect of price changes in intermediate goods may be important for the level, but 
not for the cyclical fluctuations of mark-ups. For an extensive treatment of this subject see Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1995). 
, i.e. the long-run mark-up ratios for the economy, we  used the informa- 
calculated  the  gross-production-weighted
 
tion in Martins et  al. (1996), Table 3, and    14
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3.2. Mark-up time series 
To obtain the benchmark measures of mark-up, we assume the long-run mark-up level is 
constant (P
*) along the sample period and is given by the average mark-up obtained using the 
Table 1 – Production-weighted average mark-ups 1980-1992 
















Source: Martins et al. (1996). 
NOTE: Sectors considered: Manufacturing; Electricity, Gas, and Water; 
Construction; Wholesale, Retail Trade, Restaurants, and Hotels (Wholesale and 
Retail Trade for Australia and Japan); and Transport, Storage, and Communication. 
Gross-production weights obtained using 1990 data, except for Australia (1989), 
Belgium, Finland, and Sweden (1995), Italy (1985), and Netherlands (1986). 
$ - West Germany. 
Next, we allow the long-run parameters (Dt, )t) to change smoothly over time. We obtain 
the balanced-growth-path series for the pair of parameters using the Hoddrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter with O = 100. The series for Dt is simply given by HP(1 - st,100). The series for )t is 
Finally, we obtain our mark-up measure by substituting the above-mentioned values in 
















 .  (15) 
than one. Thus, there are two effects pushing Pt away from its long-run value (P
*): (i) when 
the labour share deviates from its trend; and (ii) when the input combination also deviates 
information in Martins et al. (1996), reported in Table 3. 


















− ≡  is a measure of the cyclical position of the input combination. 
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from its long-run value. When the labour share overshoots its trend, the mark-up is lower than 
its average value, while xt has the opposite effect. 
Table 2 shows us that the mark-up measure can be considered mildly counter-cyclical in 
nine out of fourteen countries in our sample, pro-cyclical for three of them, and 
approximately a-cyclical for two countries. 
Table 2 – Cyclical properties of the mark-up (1970-2007) 
Country  Corr(Pt, Yt) Corr(Pt, Yt-1) Corr(Pt, Yt+1)
Australia -0.172  -0.136  -0.255 
Belgium -0.311  -0.242  -0.313 
Canada 0.049  -0.014  0.047 
Denmark 0.155  0.078  0.193 
Finland -0.177  -0.171  -0.153 
France -0.291  -0.304  -0.265 
Germany 0.231  0.185  0.198 
Italy   -0.702  -0.704  -0.678 
Japan -0.223  -0.108  -0.221 
Netherlands -0.255  -0.283  -0.244 
Norway 0.069  0.101  0.057 
Sweden -0.542  -0.575  -0.504 
UK -0.295  -0.370  -0.280 
US 0.299  0.171  0.325 
NOTE: Correlations between the ratios of each variable and its trend component 
given by a HP filter. 
Appendix 1 presents some alternative mark-up measures using another specification for the 
production function, using Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) as a different source for the 
long-run mark-ups, dividing the period in sub-periods, and also alternative ways of computing 
the deep parameters, including the Monacelli and Perotti (2008) approach of using the labour 
share.
Figure 1 plots for the six countries the benchmark mark-up and respective total factor 
productivity measures. It is possible to observe a non-stationary behaviour of TFP (in logs), 
indicating that the series are I(1), and a stationary pattern for the mark-up, I(0) series, which 
was afterwards confirmed by formal ADF unit root tests. 16
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Figure 1 – Mark-up and TFP 
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The period-averages for the mark-ups plotted in Figure 1 are 1.310 (Australia), 1.289 
(Belgium), 1.286 (Canada), 1.265 (Denmark), 1.267 (Finland), 1.273 (France), 1.290 
(Germany), 1.437 (Italy), 1.286 (Japan), 1.276 (Netherlands), 1.210 (Norway), 1.229 
(Sweden), 1.249 (UK), and 1.198 (US). These values compare with the mark-up of 1.23 
reported for the US in Bayoumi et al. (2004). 
4. VAR analysis 
4.1. Setting up the VAR  
We estimate a five-variable VAR model for the period 1970-2007 for the above-mentioned 
set of OECD countries. The variables in the VAR are real total final government consumption 
expenditure plus real government investment, G, real output, Y, real taxes T, all in logarithms, 
the mark-up, P, and the logarithm of the level of productivity, A (the corresponding measure 
of TFP). The macro variables are per head of working-age population (between 15 and 64 
years old). Moreover, productivity, A, real output, real total final government expenditure and 
real taxes will usually enter in first differences, and the mark-up, P, enters in levels, in order 
that all variables in the VAR are I(0). 
The VAR model in standard form can be written as 
1
p




   ¦ Xc V X İ  .  (16) 18
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where Xt denotes the(5 1) u  vector of the five endogenous variables given 
by >@
'
ln ln ln ln tt t t t t AGTY P {' ' ' ' X , c is a (5 1) u vector of intercept terms, V is the 




P H HHHH ªº { ¬¼ İ . The lag length of the endogeneous variables, p,
will be determined by the usual information criteria. 
The VAR is ordered from the most exogenous variable to the least exogenous one, with the 
log of TFP in the first position. As a result, a shock to productivity may have an instantaneous 
effect on all the other variables. However, TFP does not respond contemporaneously to any 
structural disturbances to the remaining variables. In the same way, total final government 
expenditure also does not react contemporaneously to taxes, to GDP or to the mark-up, due 
for instance, to lags in government decision-making. In other words, the mark-up, GDP, 
taxes, and final government spending, may affect productivity with a one-period lag. For 
instance, a shock in taxes, the third variable, does not have an instantaneous impact on 
consumption expenditure of general government or in techonology, but it affects 
contemporaneously real output and the mark-up. 
In addition to the data used in section three, to compute the average mark-up throughout 
time, we now used for the VAR also the following series: total final government consumption 
expenditure (1.1.0.0.OCTG), government gross fixed capital formation (1.0.0.0.UIGG), while 
government revenues are the sum of direct taxes (1.0.0.0.UTYG), indirect taxes 
(1.0.0.0.UTVG), and social security contributions (1.0.0.0.UTSG). 
4.2. Estimation and results 
Since real output, real total final government consumption expenditure, real output, real 
taxes and TFP are I(1) variables, they enter in the VAR in first differences. On the other hand, 
the mark-up is a I(0) variable entering therefore in levels in the VAR. The unit root tests 
provide similar stationarity results for all countries (see Table 3). 19
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Table 3 – Unit-root tests: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics 


























Australia -2.61  -2.36
# -3.31  -2.94
$ -5.15 -3.32 -3.56  -3.20
$& -4.93  -2.61 
Belgium -2.31  -2.61
# -2.59  -2.61
# -5.75 -3.62 -3.24  -3.22
$& -4.30 -4.23
&
Canada -1.89  -2.61
# -1.51  -1.61
# -4.64 -3.63 -3.56 -3.63 -3.76 -3.63 
Denmark -1.22  -1.61
# -4.15  -3.62  -53.4  -3.63  -3.33 -2.94 
$ -7.95 -4.23
&
Finland -1.13  -1.61
 # -3.49  -2.94 
$ -4.47  -3.63  -2.69 -2.61
# -3.53 -2.94
 $
France -1.79  -2.61
# -2.66  -2.62
# -4.43 -2.62 -3.43  -3.20
#& -5.36 -4.23
&
Germany -4.35  -3.63  -3.29  -2.94
$ -5.72 -3.63 -3.85 -3.63 -3.49 -2.95
$
Italy -1.23  -1.61
# -5.85  -3.62  -3.87  -3.63  -3.67  -3.54 
$& -3.79  -3.62 
Japan -4.91  -3.65  -2.24  -2.61
# -4.09 -3.62 -4.00  -3.54
$& -5.63  -3.63 
Netherlands -2.60 -2.60
# -3.40  -2.94
$ -3.66 -3.62 -3.00 -2.94
$ -5.20 -3.63 
Norway -0.87  -1.61
#  -4.44 -3.63 -3.80 -3.63 -4.34 -3.63 -4.28 -3.63 
Sweden -5.78  -3.63  -2.63  -2.61
# -6.71 -3.62 -2.31 -4.23 -4.56 -3.63 
UK -2.54  -2.60  -4.15  -3.63  -4.50  -4.24  -3.54  -3.54
$ -5.64 -4.23 
US -4.56  -3.58  -3.44  -2.93
$ -5.10 -3.58 -6.61 -3.58 -3.15 -2.92
$
Notes: critical values are for 1% level unless otherwise mentioned. 
# – 10% level; $ – 5% level; & – with time trend.
In the case of Sweden, there is a break around 1991 in the series for real GDP and real 
taxes, linked to the banking crisis and economic downturn in the beginning of the 1990’s. 
Therefore, in the VAR for Sweden we also include a dummy variable that assumes the value 
one for 1991 (zero otherwise) and that turns out to be statistically significant in the 
regressions for real GDP, real taxes and TFP. A similar situation occurred for the case of 
Finland, where a dummy varible for 1991 was also used. In addition, for  Germany a dummy 
variable was also needed, and was strongly statiscally significant, for 1991, when the series 
reflect the German reunification effect.
5
The VAR order used in the estimation of each model was selected with the Akaike and the 
Schwarz information criteria. Those tests led us to choose a parsimonious model with only 
 could not reject the null hypothesis of no serial residual correlation. In addition, we
 did not reject the null hypothesis of normality of the VAR residuals (see Table 4). 
                                                
5 We used Zivot and Andrews (1992) recursive approach to test the null of unit root against the alternative of 
stationarity with structural change at some unknown break date. The results allow the rejection of the unit root 
hypothesis in particular for the logarithmic growth rate of real taxes and GDP in Sweden, and for GDP and the 
mark-up for Finland. A similar result occurs for Germany. 
one lag for ten countries, two lags for three countries, and  three lags for one country,  which 
helped  avoid  the  use  of too many degrees of freedom. With such specifications we also20
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Australia 0.461 0.195 2 35 
Belgium  0.630 0.118 1 36 
Canada 0.320 0.176 1 36 
Denmark 0.090 0.230 2 35 
Finland 0.392 0.457 1 36 
France  0.408 0.024 3 34 
Germany 0.180 0.456 1 36 
Italy  0.184 0.473 1 36 
Japan 0.370 0.286 1 36 
Netherlands 0.186 0.197 1 36 
Norway  0.214 0.564 1 36 
Sweden 0.806 0.277 1 36 
UK 0.329  0.125  2  35 
US 0.343 0.359 1 36 
NOTE: We considered the maximum VAR order to be three. 
1 – Multivariate residual serial correlation LM test. For the null hypothesis of no 
serial autocorrelation (of order one) the test statistic as an asymptotic chi-square 
distribution with k
2 degrees of freedom. 
2 – Multivariate Jarque-Bera residual normality test. For the null hypothesis of 
normality, the test statistic has an asymptotic chi-square. 
In Figure 2 we plot simultaneously the average responses of real output and of the mark-up 
to a one standard deviation shock to real final government spending, and to a one standard 
deviation technological shock, for the countries covered in this study. Figure A1 in Appendix 
2 reports the impulse-response functions to shocks in TFP and real government final 
spending. Impulse-response functions to shocks in the remaining three variables are not 
shown due to length constraints and in order to concentrate in the main topic of the paper. 
First, let us analyse the reaction of output to unexpected productivity shocks. In general, 
there is strong evidence of a positive impact effect on output, despite the fact that Finland and 
the UK present very small positive effects. When we consider the cummulated effect after 
two, five, and ten periods, we observe a similar overall pattern with only negative reactions in 
Belgium and occasional negative values for either Finland or the UK. 
Second, there is also strong evidence of an increase in average mark-ups following a 
positive TFP shock. Australia, Belgium, and Finland are the notable exceptions for the impact 
period. When we consider the cummulated effects Norway occasionally joins the group with 
either a small negative or a very small positive effect. We only observe positive cummulated 
effects after ten periods. 
Therefore, we can conclude that, in general, mark-ups present a pro-cyclical behaviour 
after a productivity shock. This is observed for 12 countries in our sample in either the impact 
period and also considering the cummulated effects after two, five, and ten periods This 21
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outcome is consistent with most endogenous mark-ups hypothesis in the literature, either of 
the undesired or of the desired kinds: a productivity shock has a strong direct effect in shifting 
the marginal-cost schedule downnwards and a smaller effect moving rightwards along both 
the marginal-cost and demand curves when output increases.
6
Third, let us observe the effect of an unexpected shock in government final spending on 
output. A group of six countries show a considerable short-run (i.e. impact) Keynesian 
very small positive reactions of output to a positive fiscal schock of this kind. Australia and 
Denmark join the group when we consider the cummulated effects after two, five, and ten 
periods, but Germany,  Sweden, and the UK leave it. Canada shows a long-run (i.e. 
considering the first ten periods cummulated) non-Keynesian effect. France, Netherlands, 
Norway, and the US also present evidence consistent with the so-called non-Keynesian 
effects.
7
Fourth, there is strong evidence of a decrease in average mark-ups following a positive 
government-spending shock. Sweden and the US are the notable exceptions to this pattern in 
the impact period. France, Japan, and the UK occasionaly join the group for larger time 
windows, but no more than four countries present simultaneously a positive cummulated 
effect on mark-ups. 
Thus, we can conclude that, for most countries, mark-ups present a counter-cyclical 
behaviour following a government spending shock. This is observed at least for seven 
countries in our sample in either the impact period and also considering the cummulated 
effects after two, five, and ten periods. Australia, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden are the exceptions in the short run. We can only find evidence of consistent pro-
cyclical behaviour of mark-ups for the Netherlands and Norway. Germany also presents a 
similar pattern from period two onwards. Canada, Japan, and the UK also present 
occasionally less expected combinations. Again, the results obtained are consistent with 
existing theoretical endogenous mark-ups models: a government spending shock, or a similar 
aggregate demand shock, implies a shift to the right in the demand curve and a rightward 
                                                
6 Nominal rigidity provides a good example of a constant or sluggish marginal-revenue curve faced by each 
producer.
7 Notice that nothing can be said for higher frequencies, especially for quarterly data. 
effect: Belgium, Canada,  Finland, Germany, Japan, and Sweden. Italy and the UK present 22
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movement along the marginal-cost curve when output increases, with a smaller increase in 
prices than the one observed in marginal costs.
8
Figure 2 – Responses to a one standard deviation shock 












































































































































































































                                                
8 Once again, the nominal rigidity example illustrates how the (undesired) mark-up reduction (increase) arises 
simultaneously with an output increase (reduction). 23
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However, most theoretical models with endogenous mark-ups, either of the undesired or 
the desired types, predict that we should expect counter-cyclical mark-ups when shocks 
originate on the demand side of the economy and pro-cyclical mark-ups when shocks are of 
technological nature (on the supply side). The evidence here produced points precisely in this 
direction. On the other hand, the relative strength of Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects of 
fiscal policy is also rather controversial in the empirical literature. 
To our knowledge, the closest article to our approach is Monacelli and Perotti (2008) that 
also employ a VAR technology to study the interaction between mark-ups and fiscal policy 
for the US Using quarterly data, and alternative measures of government spending and 
different methods for identifying shocks and measuring mark-ups, their results also indicate a 
counter-cyclical behaviour of the mark-up with fiscal shocks.  
Recently, Hall (2009) surveys the literature on fiscal policy effectiveness, especially on the 
VAR estimates of short-run m u ltipliers, and relates it to mark-up measures using a counter-
cyclical mark-up model. 24
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4.3. Robustness 
Using alternative mark-up measures and the corresponding TFP measures in the VAR 
analysis provided similar results. This should not be a surprise if one takes into account the 
high correlations between the alternative and the benchmark measures, once we de-trend them 
(see Table A2 in Appendix 1). 
Despite the fact that most qualitative results hold for most countries, there are some 
quantitative differences and some indications that using one type of mark-up and TFP 
measures may be crucial to the outcomes. Further investigation is needed in this front. 
In addition, we also estimated the VAR models using first differences of the level of the 
variables, instead of logarithmic differences, but the results were broadly similar. 
Finally, and in order to allow for the interaction of interest rates, we replicated as an 
example the VAR analysis for the US, using either short-term or long-term interest rates. The 
results did not change. 
4.4. Multipliers and mark-ups in the long run 
One of the central issues in the early New Keynesian literature is the relationship between 
fiscal-policy effectiveness and market power in the long run – see, inter alia, Costa (2007).

































it it X H '  represents the effect, given by the impulse-response function, of an 
unexpected shock to government final spending on variable X for country i in period t.
The long-run multiplier is obtained dividing  ˆi K  by the share of government final spending 
in GDP. The estimates for the multiplier are presented in Table 5.25
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The correlation with the long-run mark-up measures presented in Table 1 is 0.34 in levels 
and 0.42 in ranks. This positive correlation is robust to using the government-spending share 
in GDP as an instrument to control for mark-up endogeneity, since both variables present a 
correlation of -0.24. 
Therefore, there is some evidence that fiscal policy tends to be more effective in countries 
where product markets are more imperfectly competitive. Costa (2007) suggests that larger 
correlations should be observed if we took into account the effect of capital depreciation on 
output, i.e. had we used a net- instead of a gross-output measure in the VAR. 
 
5. Panel VAR 
In this section we estimate the VAR model in a panel format in order to pool together the 
time and cross-section dimensions and profit from the gains of efficiency in the estimation 
procedure.  The panel VAR (PVAR) specification draws on the country-specific case, 









   ¦ Xc V X İ . (18) 
 
In (16) the index i (i=1,…,N) denotes the country, the index t (t=1,…,T) indicates the period,  
Xit is the vector of the endogenous variables given 
                                                 









ln ln ln ln it it it it it it AGTY P {' ' ' ' X , c0 is a vector of intercept terms, V is the 
matrix of autoregressive coefficients, vi is the matrix of country-specific fixed effects, and the 
vector of random disturbances
' AGTY
it it it it it it
P H HHHH ªº { ¬¼ İ . The lag length of the 
endogeneous variables, p, will be set in this case to one, based also on the previously 
uncovered country-specific VAR evidence. Since our time dimension is not that small, the use 
of time dummies would imply a loss of efficency. 
The PVAR allows treating all variables as jointly endogenously, with each variable 
depending on its past information and on the realizations of the other variables.  In addition 
the use of the panel VAR approach increases the degrees of freedom for the estimation. On 
the other hand, the PVAR set-up imposes a similar lag structure across all the countries. 
Nevertheless, cross-section heterogeneity can be accounted for via the fixed effects, an the 
bias due to the existence of lagged endogenous variables can be overcome by using GMM.
We also checked for the existence of unit roots in the panel using the panel data integration 
tests of Im et al. (2003) and Levin et al. (2002), which assume cross-sectional independence 
among panel units (except for common time effects). Concerning the first difference of TFP, 
government spending, revenues, and GDP, the results given by the panel data unit root tests 
(reported in Appendix 3) essentially reveal that the null unit root hypothesis can be rejected. 
The same is true for the level of the mark-up, which overall confirms the same integration 
order for the variables in the panel as well as in the country-specific analysis.
The results of the PVAR impulse response functions are presented in Figure 3. 
Accordingly, we can observe a pro-cyclical behaviour of the mark-up with total factor 
productivity shocks, and a counter-cyclical behaviour of the mark-up with fiscal spending 
shocks. Such results confirm the overall picture that was uncovered with the country-specific 
VAR evidence. 
                                                
 In our computations we use the programs from Love and Zicchino (2006), which include a routine for the 
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Figure 3 – Panel VAR impulse-response functions 
Shock in G





















Note: Errors are 5 per cent on each side generated by Monte Carlo with 1000 replications. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have computed the average mark-up throughout time as a market-power 
measure, and studied its interaction with fiscal policy and other macroeconomic variables, 
using a five-variable annual VAR for OECD countries. The mark-up measure is calculated in 
a standard fashion, but we allowed for smooth changes in the long-run technological 
parameters. 
We produced illustrative results with annual data for the period 1970-2007, for a group of 
14 OECD countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the US. The VAR impulse response functions 28
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show that, in general the mark-up (i) depicts a pro-cyclical behaviour with productivity 
shocks and (ii) a mildly counter-cyclical behaviour with fiscal spending shocks. Furthermore, 
we also obtain non-Keynesian impacts of real final government spending on output in some 
cases.
Finally, we also used a Panel Vector Auto-Regression analysis, increasing the efficiency in 
the estimations, which overall confirmed the country-specific results regarding the behaviour 
of the mark-up. 
From a policy point of view, positive productivity shocks imply, by its nature, a rightward 
shift in labour demand, but an increased mark-up weakens the initial expansive effect on both 
employment (and output) and real wages. On the other hand, positive fiscal shocks show, 
besides their usual wealth effect via future taxes expanding the labour supply, an additional 
effect due to a decrease in the mark-up that shifts the labour demand rightwards, stimulating 
further employment (and output) and also real wages. Our results, illustrating the counter-
cyclical behaviour of the mark-up with fiscal spending shocks, imply a stronger effectiveness 
of fiscal policy on output and this is especially relevant when the fiscal multiplier is positive. 
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Appendix 1 – Alternative mark-up measures 
 
In order to generate alternative mark-up measures to assess the robustness of our 
results, we used five types of variations to the benchmark measure: 




tt t AK L
D D    /  ,  (A1) 
where  t > 0. Notice that if we had /t = 0, we would also obtain a constant-returns-to-
scale Cobb-Douglas production function. 
2.  In addition we used a different source for the long-run mark-up measures as well. 
In this case we considered Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008), Table 1, that present 
average mark-ups for 9 countries for the period 1981-2004. 
3.  We also divided the period into three sub-periods, using information available in 
Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008), Table 2, to test for time-varying long-run mark-
ups, using the periods 1970-79, 1981-92, and 1993-2004. Unfortunately, the data is 
only available for the manufacturing sector. 
4.  We also assumed that deep parameters (Dt, and )t or /t) could exhibit a fixed value 
over the period or for each sub-period considered, instead of changing smoothly. 
5.  Finally, we also considered an approach inspired by Monacelli and Perotti (2008), 
by assuming that It = Dt. Notice that, in this case, the mark-up measure is given by 1/st, 
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* Period  Deep parameters (D,
and )or/)
Benchmark  Equation (6)  Martins et al. (1996)  Whole  Smooth changes (HP) 
1  Equation (A1)  Martins et al. (1996)  Whole  Smooth changes (HP) 
2 -  -  Whole  P = 1/s
3  Equation (6)  Martins et al. (1996)  Whole  Fixed (average) 
4  Equation (6)  Christopoulou and 
Vermeulen (2008), 
Table 1 
Whole Fixed  (average) 





3 step changes 
(average)
6  Equation (6)  Christopoulou and 
Vermeulen (2008), 
Table 1 
Whole  Smooth changes (HP) 





Smooth changes (HP) 
8  Equation (A1)  Martins et al. (1996)  Whole  Fixed (average) 
9  Equation (A1)  Christopoulou and 
Vermeulen (2008), 
Table 1 
Whole Fixed  (average) 





3 step changes 
(average)
11  Equation (A1)  Christopoulou and 
Vermeulen (2008), 
Table 1 
Whole  Smooth changes (HP) 





Smooth changes (HP) 
NOTE: All mark-up and TFP series available on request from the authors. 
Table A2 – Correlations between the cyclical components of benchmark and alternative 
mark-up measures (1970-2007) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
Australia 0.973  -  0.991  - - - -  0.924  - - - - 
Belgium  0.960 0.999 0.988 0.988 0.709 0.999 0.993 0.888 0.934 0.831 0.891 0.913 
Canada 0.949  -  0.995  - - - -  0.850  - - - - 
Denmark 0.862  -  0.992  - - - -  0.928  - - - - 
Finland 0.933 1.000 0.983 0.982 0.637 1.000 0.992 0.909 0.884 0.585 0.882 0.884 
France  0.935 0.999 0.976 0.975 0.840 0.999 0.997 0.934 0.956 0.798 0.945 0.960 
Germany  0.892 0.999 0.992 0.992 0.820 0.999 0.993 0.952 0.938 0.946 0.939 0.946 
Italy  0.878 0.992 0.974 0.962 0.889 0.992 0.974 0.872 0.700 0.822 0.780 0.815 
Japan 0.966  -  0.984  - - - -  0.976  - - - - 
Netherlands 0.919 0.999 0.991 0.988 0.718 0.999 0.988 0.948 0.968 0.758 0.941 0.887 
Norway  0.974  -  0.997  - - - -  0.981  - - - - 
Sweden  0.945  -  0.993  - - - -  0.985  - - - - 
UK 0.954  -  0.998  - - - -  0.944  - - - - 
US 0.972 0.991 0.993 0.975 0.577 0.991 0.923 0.918 0.781 0.533 0.777 0.524 
Note: Correlations between the ratio of each measure to its trend component given by a HP filter. 33
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Appendix 2 – Impulse-response functions 
Figure A1 – Impulse-response functions, shocks to spending (G) and productivity (A)
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Note: Y- axis, percent deviations from the un-shocked path; X- axis, years. 
Appendix 3 – Panel unit-root results 
Table A3 – Summary of panel-data unit-root tests (1970-2007) 





Levin et al. (2002) t stat 1/ 
'lnAit   -0.7078  0.2395  14  490 
'lnGit -6.5523  0.0000  14  490 
'lnTit -4.2789  0.0000  14  490 
'lnYit -12.0364  0.0000  14  490 
Pit -5.8392  0.0000  14  504 
Im et al. (2003) W-stat 2/ 
'lnAit   -1.7167  0.0430  14  490 
'lnGit -8.9425  0.0000  14  490 
'lnTit -3.3877  0.0004  14  490 
'lnYit -10.807  0.0000  14  490 
Pit -6.7250  0.0000  14  504 
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel. 
1/ Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process). 
2/ Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process). Working PaPer SerieS
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